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in African American Philosophy: Disclosing the Existential 
Phenomenological Foundations of Black Bodies, White Gazes: 
The Continuing Significance of Race,” describes Yancy’s project 
as making a major shift in African American philosophy toward 
an existential phenomenological approach. Headley highlights 
one of Yancy’s objectives as justifying the legitimacy of the issue 
of race on an existential basis. According to Headley, Yancy 
accomplishes this through a phenomenological analysis of the 
concrete lived experiences of Black persons, focusing on the 
body. The meaning of the Black self is, in part, a constructed 
historical reality, one in which the white gaze plays a significant 
role. Finally, David Clinton Wills provides a short review of 
Yancy’s Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance 
of Race.
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Towards a Latin American Political Philosophy 
of/for the United States: From the Discovery 
of America to Immigrant Encounters
Grant Silva
University of Oregon
It could be said that the phrase “Latin American political 
philosophy” is a pleonasm at best, a tautology at worse. Much 
of what is considered “Latin American philosophy” consists 
of inquiries related to politics, social organization, cultural 
authenticity, and economic independence or development, 
not to mention the fact that many Latin American philosophers 
have held some type of political office or civil service position 
throughout their lives.1 Jorge J. E. Gracia refers to the political 
orientation of Latin American philosophy in his entry in The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy:
It is difficult to characterize Latin American Philosophy 
in a way applicable to all of its 500-year history. The 
most one can say is that, in contrast with European and 
Anglo-American philosophy, it has maintained a strong 
human and social interest, has been consistently 
affected by Scholastic and Catholic thought, and has 
significantly affected the social and political institutions 
in the region. Latin American philosophers tend to be 
active in the educational, political, and social lives of 
their countries and deeply concerned with their own 
cultural identity.2
Iván Márquez ventures so far as to suggest that the political 
tendency of Latin American thought might even be considered 
a principle.3 He writes, “Latin America is a place where thought 
and action are often seen as going together. The line between 
thinkers and doers is not easily demarcated. The word and the 
deed, in many cases, go hand in hand. And many times, words 
are seen as deeds.” Márquez continues, “Many Latin Americans 
use the word praxis to identify this thinking for/about/in action, 
and in many cases, this kind of active thought or thoughtful act 
is further regarded as transformative or liberatory [sic].”4 It is in 
this line of thought that I attempt to rethink the political axioms 
that emerge from but also support interpretations of the initial 
meetings between the indigenous inhabitants of America and 
the European colonizers. 
I focus on two paradigmatic understandings of this 
event: for some “America” was discovered while for others 
it was encountered. Equally complex and debatable, these 
historical interpretations provide a means of differentiating 
the theoretical landscape of political thought in all of the 
Americas, i.e., “the politics of discovery” and “the politics of 
encounter (encuentro).” While most literature regarding the 
debate between “encounter” and “discovery” concerns the 
perspective(s) represented by each term (i.e., either European, 
“Latin American,” mestizo/a and indigenous), encounter and 
discovery characterize different responses to multiculturalism, 
different notions of the state, and (consequently) alternative 
conceptions of state-membership, i.e., citizenship.5 Ultimately, I 
suggest that the politics of encuentro are better for dealing with 
the migratory and multicultural nature of twenty-first-century 
societies—hence a Latin American political philosophy for the 
United States.
My understanding of discovery and encuentro correspond 
with what I take to be the two fundamental questions at the 
base of all political philosophy in America: the justification of the 
initial settler colonies in what became the United States and the 
justification of Iberian conquest in what became Latin America. 
The politics of encuentro acknowledge the fact that nation-
states are sites where different people come together and 
interact, building heterogeneous bonds that transcend borders. 
The politics of discovery, as I will frame it here, assumes an 
enclosed, self-sufficient polity that privileges homogeneity 
through exclusionary practices such as cultural assimilation. My 
main contention is the following: If we can rethink the nature 
of the state in a way that recognizes its dependence upon such 
things as cultural diversity, third world labor, an immigrant 
workforce, and international commerce, perhaps this can 
inform us of alternative conceptions of state-membership and 
civil participation that are fluid, grounded in material need and 
connected to actual political communities.
The first section of this paper expands upon the paradigm 
of discovery. My goal is to link this paradigm to what Carole 
Pateman calls “the settler society.”6 The second section presents 
the political possibilities that exist within the paradigm of 
encuentro. Latin American immigrants in the United States 
offer an alternative framework for how to think about the state 
(and thus citizenship) from their experience of living in foreign 
lands amongst others of different ways of life—hence a Latin 
American political philosophy of the United States. An implicit 
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goal of this paper is to place Latin American philosophy into 
conversation with Anglo-American social and political thought. 
In this light, I suggest that political liberalism (the dominant 
political philosophy of Anglo-America) has maintained domestic 
or “nationalistic” tendencies that resemble settler-oriented 
commitments. Getting past these limitations is perhaps the next 
hurdle for political liberalism and those concerned with social 
justice in its broadest sense. 
I. United States Settlerism and the Discovery of 
America
“Discovery” is the dominant interpretation of the events of 
1492 in the Anglo-American world. In a place like the United 
States, where the national character of the country is said 
to be historically Anglo-Protestant, the discovery of America 
signifies a barren land, empty of real human inhabitants. 
The most apparent manifestation of this line of thought is the 
appropriation of the term “American” to describe the citizens of 
the United States—as if the only Americans that exist live within 
the boundaries of the United States.7 Founded upon the idea 
of empty land, or what Pateman calls terra nullius, the politics 
of discovery lends itself to a nationalism that requires cultural 
assimilation or amalgamation—the idea that all immigrants 
should conform to Anglo-American tradition and culture if they 
want to live in the United States and be “American.”
The link between the paradigm of discovery and 
assimilative expectations is the settler society, a self-sustaining, 
enclosed community of transplanted individuals (Europeans) 
living in a recently colonized or “new” region. In Contract 
and Domination (coauthored with Charles Mills), Pateman 
argues that the question of legitimacy is unavoidable for the 
settler societies of Great Britain, e.g., the United States and 
Australia.8 Historical justifications, which draw heavily from 
John Locke, among others, bypass any debate about whether 
the initial colonies of Great Britain were predicated on conquest 
or colonialism, the former being the outright declaration of 
war against natives while the latter is the establishment of a 
settlement. For Pateman, the idea of terra nullius in addition to 
the rights of husbandry help justify British colonial enterprises by 
referring to unused land and the absence of formal government 
(European forms of sovereignty) amongst native people.9 In this 
manner “conquest” is said to be a nonissue at the beginning of 
the United States (although one can argue that after Manifest 
Destiny, the appropriation of Mexican land, and other American 
imperial projects conquest is now a central concern).10
Settlerism connected to terra nullius serves two purposes: 
First, it explains how and why countries like the United States 
can lay claim to the land that they exist on. In an area lacking 
sovereign inhabitants or where indigenous people fail to 
recognize the full potential of the land they live on, early 
colonial thinkers saw the potential for justifying appropriation. 
By positing terra nullius, apologists of European imperialism 
created a clean slate (using the language of “state of nature”) 
from where social compacts could be created. As Pateman 
argues, the supposed social contracts that pervade modern 
conceptions of government legitimize sovereign authority 
using a rhetoric of emptiness that simultaneously provides 
land rights and hegemonic power, since according to modern 
standards no state could be formed in an area with competing 
sovereigns.11 As the idea of sovereignty transitions from that 
of a monarch to that of a people, the second purpose of terra 
nullius comes into play.
The settler question provides a means through which 
ethnic and racial homogeneity is first situated in the colony and 
then maintained in the nation. This sentiment is expressed well 
by John Jay in Federalist Paper No. 2:
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice 
that Providence has been pleased to give this one 
connected country to one united people—a people 
descended from the same ancestors, speaking 
the same language, professing the same religion, 
attached to the same principles of government, very 
similar in their manners and customs, and who, by 
their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by 
side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly 
established general liberty and independence.12
Eduardo H. Galeano makes a similar point when he writes, 
The Mayflower pilgrims did not cross the sea to obtain 
legendary treasures; they came mainly to establish 
themselves with their families and to reproduce 
in the New World the system of life and work they 
had practiced in Europe. They were not soldiers of 
fortune but pioneers; they came not to conquer but to 
colonize, and their colonies were settlements.13
Historically, the settler societies of New England did not live 
amongst natives and form mixed communities like the Iberian 
Conquistadors did in what became Latin America.14 Inherent 
to the sovereignty claims expressed by settler communities 
seeking national independence was the idea that they do so 
as an organized and distinguished polity. Familial relations, 
ethnicity, or religion tended to be that which differentiated 
settler societies from native peoples or other groups. However, 
when such things as kinship serve as the basis of political 
communities, the types of national identities that result exhibit 
a logic of exclusion and understandings of racial purity that 
culminate in hypodescent theories of race or neo-nativist 
sentiments which argue for a unifying culture.15
By maintaining exclusive communities of ethnically or 
culturally European people—in terms of legal citizenship this 
was obvious with Chinese Exclusion, the denial of Women’s 
rights, Jim Crow law, anti-Irish and Italian immigration, and 
more recently against undocumented peoples—one can 
view the United States as a full partner in colonial projects 
of the North Atlantic (which is a point that demonstrates the 
difference between “post-colonial” and “de-colonial”). Today, 
the fight to maintain the uniformity of United States national 
identity, amidst the growing minority-majority population, is an 
attempt to maintain the legacy of imperial hegemony.16 Thus, 
nationalisms that incorporate assimilative ideals require that 
immigrants integrate into the dominant social group when 
seeking admission into the body politic of a country such as 
the United States—assuming that full admission is possible 
in the first place. Arguments in favor of assimilation arise 
from the concern that multiculturalism and the existence of 
immigrant or minority cultural enclaves may result in the 
division or balkanization of the country.17 Here, the price for 
official membership is an individual’s cultural existence. With 
assimilative nationalisms, cultural influence is one directional: 
immigrants must conform and not the dominant national 
group. The paradigm of discovery, in this sense, establishes 
a framework from where one can justify the exclusive right 
to land and the subsequent right to determine the meaning 
of “American.” In this setting, immigrants and the subsequent 
children of immigrant peoples forever maintain an outsider 
positioning that preempts the possibility of being a part of the 
United States (unless one is willing to buy into the politics of 
discovery). Here, the United States nation is a static ideal based 
on a fiction of solitude and uniformity. 
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II. The Politics of Encounter: Towards a Latino/a 
Political Philosophy 
Thinking about the political existence of Latino/as and Latin 
American immigrants in the United States is predicated on 
different axioms than the legacy of much Anglo-American 
political thought. Political issues regarding Latino/as do not 
presuppose land to be open and ripe for the taking. Through 
the lens of migration, Latin American immigrants arrive into 
populated or occupied territories. For migrants, the political 
question is one where dealing with differences and being 
“extra-national” cannot be ignored. As Nelson Maldonado-
Torres, Ramon Grosfugel, and Jose Saldívar write, “Migrants 
do not arrive to an empty or neutral space.”18 Histories of 
colonialism and hierarchies of power pollute the political 
spaces where immigrants seek to go. Thus, for Latin American 
immigrants, and by association Latino/as who are already in 
the United States, a different political question needs asking.19 
Rather than assuming a political philosophy that begins with 
the idea of emptiness, from where abstract principles of 
ownership can be formulated (i.e., settler contract), Latino/as 
start from trans-national predicaments grounded in the politics 
of encuentro.20 
For many, the only significance of “encounter” is the fact 
that people were in the Americas before Europeans arrived. A 
“discovery” took place only from a Eurocentric perspective.21 
I interpret encuentro only as the “con-fron-tation” of different 
people, the historical fact of a coming together.22 My interests 
are in the political significance of what happens when “peoples 
meet,” to borrow a line from Alain Locke.23 Often times these 
meetings end violently. When this occurs war and eventually 
conquest begin. War develops when the appropriation and 
control of land/resources are in the background—this tends 
to be the case when indigenous politicians win a majority of 
votes in Latin American countries or when it appears as though 
Mexicans are taking over southwestern United States.
In this light, the paradigm of encounter has been viewed 
with much suspicion. Enrique Dussel issues a warning and 
implicit criticism in the following: “If the meeting (encuentro) 
of two worlds were to signify the new hybrid, syncretistic 
culture that the mestizo race is articulating, its content would be 
acceptable. Popular culture in its own creative consciousness 
would then be producing this meeting, and not the brutal event 
of conquest.”24 The concern is that “encounter” refers to a clash 
that ended in conquest. I take Dussel’s concerns further: I am 
weary of the traps of “mestizaje” and other unifying narratives 
in Latin America (encounter being one). Often times, as José 
Vasconcelos’s Raza Cósmica can attest to, mestizo or mixed-
race identities are used in nation-building projects. These 
nationalisms glorify the dead Indian but ignore the one in front 
of them.25 When heroes of mestizaje such as Vasconcelos 
employ the idea of a coming racial synthesis (it is always off 
in the distance, which permits the status-quo to remain) they 
note the whitening or Eurocentric demand and expectation for 
indigenous conformity.26 Mario Saenz, amongst others, calls 
this a “bourgeois mestizaje” compared to a “mestizaje from 
below.”27
However, extending the idea of encounter, I argue that it is a 
better framework for dealing with questions of multiculturalism 
and perhaps even national-citizenship than is discovery. 
Encuentro lends itself to a political philosophy that responds to 
people whose existence in the United States is predicated upon 
internationality, i.e., people who, regardless of their citizenship 
status, have historically represented a “non-American” identity. 
In addition, encounters do not have to end in violence. This 
framework highlights the shared ethical responsibilities that 
people have for maintaining their places of residence or 
dwelling. Countries like the United States must recognize that 
maintaining one’s place of dwelling requires the social and 
economic contributions provided by alienated portions of 
society, those “on the outside of nationality.”28
In his attempt to formulate a definition of justice, Socrates 
makes a similar claim about the interdependence of nation-
states (for him the “polis”) in The Republic: “It’s almost 
impossible to establish a city [polis] in a place where nothing 
has to be imported. […] So we’ll need yet further people to 
import from other cities whatever is needed. […] Therefore, 
our citizens must not only produce enough for themselves at 
home, but also goods of the right quality and quantity to satisfy 
the requirements of others.”29 Interestingly enough, by assuming 
bordered, self-enclosed polities, the basic assumptions of Anglo-
American political philosophy are counter to that of encuentro. 
This renders such issues as undocumented immigration or 
justice for immigrants an international question separate 
from basic conceptions of society or justice. Take John Rawls, 
for example, the most influential political philosopher of the 
twentieth century. A Theory of Justice confines the basic 
elements of justice to a “closed system,” a self-sufficient society 
assumed to be isolated from others.30 The theory of the state 
that arises from this perspective can be understood as the 
inheritor of modern colonial forms of social arrangement, 
namely, the settler society. While it can be argued that Rawls’s 
project is meant to supply a simple theory of justice that can 
be used to later resolve more complex questions, there are 
some obvious problems with a basic conception of justice that 
alienates upwards of twelve million undocumented people. 
When justice is construed in ways that allow only “official” 
members of a country to benefit, we confine the scope, range, 
and meaning of justice.
In the twenty-first century, it is no longer possible to 
understand social justice in its most basic form within closed (or 
bordered) frameworks. Migration, trans-national corporations, 
and multinational people challenge the possibility of formulating 
theories of justice that ignore the international elements of 
twenty-first-century societies. Likewise, given the legacies of 
social oppression visible within gender or racial differences, 
questions of reparations, affirmative actions policies, and 
other redistributive procedures necessitate a trans-historical 
approach to justice.31 As Maldonado-Torres, et al., write, “The 
old way of thinking about migration is obsolete today given the 
compression of space and time.”32 One cannot think of space 
as enclosed or isolated nor can time be viewed outside of the 
causal relationships that generate each particular moment. In 
considering the nature of justice, these new ideas of time and 
space must be acknowledged.
While I do not expect the paradigm of encounter to 
create immediate immigration reform, I do think it will put 
political thinkers on the path towards alternative bases for 
state-membership. The need to rethink citizenship is upon 
political philosophers in the twenty-first century. Even though 
climate change, depleting natural resources, war, and economic 
hardships are expected to increase human movement across 
the globe, state sovereignty does not appear to be going away. 
Thus, conceptions of state-membership (in both the legal 
and national sense) that can accommodate the existence of 
borders and yet make them less relevant in our everyday life 
are needed.33 Rather than starting as pure national, Latino/as 
begin from inter-national predicaments, with foreign nationality, 
race, ethnicity, and even culture serving as the signifiers of this 
status. With a notion of state-membership that begins “inter-
subjectively,” the model for social interaction is not assimilation 
but asimilao, an idea that fosters reciprocal cultural exchanges 
between immigrants and other “extra-national” individuals.34 
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This is perhaps a better model for the state in the age of 
human migration. Human interests are better served by taking 
encounters for what they are, meetings, and trying to foster a 
sense of dialogue and mutual respect that does not alienate 
significant portions of society nor ignore the legal demands of 
civil participants who lack proper identification.
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Racial political solidarity has been discussed by a range of 
philosophers and political theorists in the United States, often 
in the context of Black-White relations. Tommie Shelby, for 
example, offers a sympathetic defense of Black unity in the 
interests of racial justice.2 Similarly, in a recent book, Juliet 
Hooker articulates some key elements of political solidarity 
(Hooker 2009). She suggests that for many Western political 
thinkers, one of the key issues in political solidarity concerns 
“how to generate feelings of mutual obligation between citizens 
who are radically different from one another [or] [h]ow citizens 
